公司治理監督機制、企業社會責任與企業價值關聯性探討

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Title:	公司治理監督機制、企業社會責任與企業價值關聯性探討 Corporate Governance, Monitoring Mechanisms, Corporate Social Responsibility and Firm Value
Authors:	陳冠良 Chen, Guan-Liang
Contributors:	會計學系
Keywords:	過度投資假說解決衝突假說企業社會責任 over-investment hypothesis conflict-resolution hypothesis corporate social responsibility
Date:	2013-06
Issue Date:	2013-11-05 13:41:31 (UTC+8)
Abstract:	本研究探討企業履行社會責任下，公司治理監督機制與企業參與社會責任所產生的影響，以及公司治理監督機制和企業履行社會責任能否影響企業市場價值。研究理論基礎可分為兩種實證假說，過度投資假說與解決衝突假說。過度投資假說認為高階經理人會利用履行企業社會責任來提高名聲以獲取私人利益，卻可能侵蝕股東以及利害關係人權益，危害企業市場價值；而解決衝突假說認為企業履行社會責任能減緩潛在代理利益衝突，並在減緩代理衝突後提高企業市場價值。研究結果顯示公司治理監督機制與企業履行社會責任具有顯著相關性，而公司治理監督機制與企業履行社會責任也會影響企業市場價值。符合過去的研究文獻及經濟意涵，研究結果顯示公司治理監督機制能夠監督企業履行社會責任並透過企業社會責任來解決與利害關係人之間的所產生的代理利益衝突，然後影響企業市場價值。 The goal of this paper is to investigate the association between corporate gov-ernance (CG) and corporate social responsibility (CSR) engagement and examine whether the firms engaging in corporate social responsibility can maximize the market value. As a main core of this paper, we test two competing hypotheses, the over-investment hypothesis based on agency theory and the conflict-resolution hy-pothesis based on stakeholder theory. The over-investment explanation posits that top managements use the CSR engagement to enhance their private benefits of so-cial-citizen reputation that could hurt the market value of firm, whereas the conflict resolution explanation postulates that using CSR activities to reduce potential con-flicts between top management and various stakeholders and could eventually max-imize the interests of the shareholders and the market value of firm. The study finds that CSR is positively associated with the internal and external corporate governance and monitoring mechanisms, including board size, and institutional ownership. We also find CSR engagement is associated with industry adjusted Tobin’s Q. The coef-ficient on institutional investors and board size are positively significant, suggesting that institutional investors and board size can be a monitoring role to make a firm’s information environment transparent and reduce the agency cost and resolve the con-flicts between top management and various stakeholders. We also find the insider ownership can interfere the CSR decision-making. Consistent with the prior literature and economic intuition, the finding suggests that governance characteristics can monitor the CSR engagement; CSR engagement could reduce potential conflicts be-tween top management and various stakeholders.
Appears in Collections:	[Department of Accounting & Graduate Institute of Accounting] Thesis

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