近年來國內外所爆發弊案顯示，管理階層為了自身利益而進行盈餘操弄，而董事會及經理人為影響公司決策之重要人物，是否因為本身持有公司股份而進行盈餘管理為本研究之目的之一。而經營型態的不同是否也會影響盈餘管理為本研究之目的二。
本研究以2007年至2010年台灣上市櫃公司為研究樣本，探討管理者持股對盈餘管理工具之影響，並進一步研究不同經營型態的管理者持股是否對盈餘管理工具之選擇會產生不同的影響。研究利用SPSS進行研究模型之實證分析。
本研究結果顯示:不同經營型態管理者持股會影響企業使用不同的盈餘管理工具。且研究結果亦顯示家族與非家族企業之董事持股與經理人持股對其他少數股東有掠奪情形，符合Jensen and Ruback 的掠奪性假說。
In the recent years, the fraud have events showed that the managers might manipulate earnings for their own interests. Moreover, the directors of Board and the managers are crucial to influence the policy making of corporations. The first research purpose is to examine whether the ownership leads to earnings management. The second purpose is to investigate whether the different business models influence the use of earnings management.
This study selected the 2007-2010 Taiwan listed companies as the research samples to explore the influence of managerial ownership on earnings management instruments. Furthermore, this research also investigates whether the managers in different business models with their choices of earnings management instruments will produce different effects. We employed SPSS with research models to conduct empirical analyses.
The research results show that the managers in different business models might influence the corporations to use different earnings management instruments. In addition, the results also show that the ownership of directors and managers both family and non-family businesses could entrench the interest of minority shareholder. This complies with the Conflict of Interest Hypothesis by Jensen and Ruback.
