經營型態、經理人薪酬與公司績效關聯性之研究

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题名:	經營型態、經理人薪酬與公司績效關聯性之研究 Business Style, CEO Compensation and Firm Performance
作者:	林姮君 Lin, Heng Chun
贡献者:	會計學系
关键词:	高階經理人管家理論代理理論公司績效 CEO stewardship theory agency theory firm performance
日期:	2013-06
上传时间:	2013-11-05 13:17:05 (UTC+8)
摘要:	本研究在於探討經營型態與CEO薪酬對企業績效之影響，研究中以2007至2011年上市公司為對象，實證結果指出，管家經營型態相對於代理型態有較佳之經營績效表現；代理經營型態下，相對於管家型態，高階管理者之薪酬績效誘因較高。實證結果隱含，採取管家經營型態對企業所有者有較佳利益；另外，管家型態企業，相對於代理型態企業，應納入更多非金錢方式之激勵因素。 This study aims to examine the impact of managerial style and CEO compensation on firm performance. The sample consists of listed companies trading in the Taiwan Stock Market in the period from 2007 to2011. Our findings show that companies oper-ating in managerial style of stewardship, compared to agent-style firms, have better op-erating performance. In addition, this paper demonstrates that CEO pay-for-performance incentive under the agency regime, compared to that under the stewardship, is significantly higher. Such results indicate that companies operating in the regime of stewardship are beneficial to their owner, and that more non-monetary incentives may be needed to put in place for firms operating in the style of stewardship.
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