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    jsp.display-item.identifier=請使用永久網址來引用或連結此文件: https://irlib.pccu.edu.tw/handle/987654321/25721


    题名: 財務舞弊事件的傳染效應:考慮董事連結與公司治理效應
    The Contagion Effects of Financial Fraud : Considering Interlocking Directorates and Corporate Governance Effect
    作者: 黃筱崴
    Huang, Hsiao-Wei
    贡献者: 國際貿易學系
    关键词: 傳染效果
    董事連結
    財務報表重編
    contagion effect
    interlocking directorates
    restatement
    日期: 2013-06
    上传时间: 2013-10-22 14:24:31 (UTC+8)
    摘要: 本研究探討:「強制財務報表重編」事件,除引發重編公司自身股價下跌外,是否會進一步誘發與該企業有董事連結的企業(被感染公司),同樣也產生負向的股價效應,也就是產生對於被感染公司財報品質疑慮、解讀該企業董事會監督治理不佳,進而波及股價下跌的負向傳染效應。此外,本研究進一步考慮其他公司治理機制(董事長是否兼任總經理、獨立董事之有無)對上述傳染效應是否具有抑制作用。實證結果發現,當帶原公司發生強制性財務報表重編事件,確會導致自身股價下跌,且與它有共同董事的被感染公司,亦發生股價也會下跌,符合負向傳染效果的假說;另外當帶原公司與被傳染公司之共同董事為獨立董事時,其負向效果並未成立。在管理意涵上,本研究認為企業之董事確實扮演監督的重要角色,一旦監督治理不佳,投資人可能產生「株連同族」的負向解讀,並一併審視其公司治理狀況,公司應慎選董事,而董事亦不應輕忽自身重要的守門人角色。
    This study aimed at examining whether restatements that adversely affect share-holder wealth at restating firms induce negative stock price reactions among firms that have directors who sit on the board of the restating firms. We argue that restatements at a firm can cause investors to perceive the directors of the restating firms as having low quality in monitoring the financial reporting of the restating firms. To the extent that investors alter their perceptions of the financial statements issued by the contagion firms, the stock prices of the contagion firms should move in a direction consistent with that of the restating firms. We also examine whether the contagion effect of restatements through common directorships varies if the contagion firm has CEO duality or if the tainted director act as the independent director of the contagion firm.
    We identify our sample of contagion firms based on the names of the directors who sit on the board of firms that announced restatements during the 1990-2011 peri-ods. Consistent with our expectations. In the multivariate analyses, we find that the abnormal returns are lower if the contagion firm has CEO duality. But if the tainted director acts as independent director of the contagion firm, the result is not statistically significant.
    显示于类别:[國際貿易學系所] 博碩士論文

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