高階經理人更換與企業價值：經理人績效之影響

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Title:	高階經理人更換與企業價值：經理人績效之影響 CEO Turnover and Firm Value: the Impact of Managers’ Performance
Authors:	王宣惠 Wang, Hsuan-Hui
Contributors:	會計學系
Keywords:	高階經理人經理人更換市場價值經理人績效 CEO CEO turnover market value manager performance
Date:	2013-06
Issue Date:	2013-10-21 11:39:10 (UTC+8)
Abstract:	本研究在於探討績效優良與不佳CEO更換對公司價值之影響，調查之更換事件包括晉升、免除董事長職務與離職等三類；實證結果顯示，CEO績效會干擾其異動對股價之影響。優良CEO晉升消息有正向市場異常報酬，而不佳CEO晉升有負向異常報酬，顯示優良(不佳)CEO晉升會增加(降低)公司價值。優良CEO免除董事長職務消息發布會獲致負向異常報酬，而不佳CEO免除該職務會有正向異常報酬，顯示優良(不佳)CEO兼任董事長職務會提升(降低)公司價值。優良CEO離職消息會獲致負向異常報酬，而不佳CEO離職會有正向異常報酬，顯示優良(不佳)CEO離職會降低(提升)公司價值。綜言之，此實證結果顯示，CEO表現為公司價值攸關資訊。 This study is to investigate market reactions to turnover news of good-performing versus poor-performing CEOs. Events investigated are promotions, discharge of board chairman duty, and resignation of CEOs. Our findings demonstrate that CEO perfor-mance moderates the market reactions to the news of CEO turnover. Firms promoting good CEOs have positive abnormal returns while firms promoting poor CEOs reach negative abnormal returns, indicating that the promotion of good (poor) CEOs increases (decreases) firm value. News of good CEOs stripped of chairman duty has negative ab-normal returns while news of poor CEOs stripped of the duty has positive abnormal re-turns, showing that discharging good (poor) CEOs the duty decreases (increases) firm value. News of good CEO resignation has negative abnormal returns while news of poor CEO resignation has positive abnormal returns, implying that good (poor) CEO resignation decreases (increases) firm value. Taken together, our results confirm that CEO performance information is value-relevant.
Appears in Collections:	[Department of Accounting & Graduate Institute of Accounting] Thesis

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