| 摘要: | 進口關稅政策與技術授權都是影響廠商競爭與促進技術進步的重要因素, 然而, 現有文獻 卻甚少針對兩者間的相互影響關係進行深入的研究與探討。 有鑑於此, 本計畫建立一個技術 授權及三國兩廠商的進口模型, 藉此探討進口國政府在差別性關稅或單一關稅下如何決定最 適進口關稅稅率, 授權廠商如何決定最適權利金, 及兩家廠商如何決定均衡數量等議題。 再 者, 本計畫將分析技術授權對於進口國政府選擇最適進口關稅稅率以及最適進口關稅政策的 影響。 在此計畫中, 我將依序分析比較各種模型設定下市場均衡的存在及差異, 以期能完整地 探討此議題。 最後, 本計畫也將探討當兩家廠商進行 Bertrand 價格競爭時, 在各種市場情 況下, 進口國政府如何決定最適進口關稅稅率以及最適進口關稅政策等議題。
As is well-known, import tariffs and technology licensing are crucial to firm com- petition and helping technological progress. There are few papers, however, focus on analyzing their interactions. Therefore, in this project, I aim at proposing a general model, where there are two exporting countries, one importing country, and allowing various technology licensing policies, to analyze how the importing country determines the optimal discriminator or uniform tariff rates, how a licensor determines either a fixed fee or a royalty rate white licensing its technology to its rival, and the what the quantity in equilibrium are under Cournot competition. Besides, this project will analyze how the technology licensing affects the optimal tariff rates and the optimal tariff regimes, the choice of MFN and tariffs discriminatory. In order to study these issues more clearly, I will systematically analyze the existence of the corresponding market equilibriums and the differences between them. Moreover, based on the proposed models in this project, I will study above issues again under Bertrand competition. |
