| 摘要: | 在跨國授權的實例中, 當被授權廠商生產多產品 (multiple product) 或者將產品銷售至 多市場 (multiple market) 時, 則授權廠商同時扮演產業內授權與產業外授權兩種角色。 例 如: 授權廠商為 DVD code free 生產者, 而被授權廠商同時為 DVD code free 與 DVD region(country) code 的生產者。 然而, 現有文獻卻很少探討此多市場特性對於最適授權策 略、 最適賀易政策與社會福利的影響等議題進行深入的研究與探討。 有鑑於此, 本計畫將建立 一個多市場特性及跨國授權的一般化模型, 並藉此探討在成本減少 (品質改善) 的技術創新 下, 授權廠商如何決定最適權利金與最適授權策略, 以及兩家廠商如何決定均衡數量等議題。 再者, 本計畫將分析多市場特性對授權廠商選擇最適授權策略的影響。 最後, 本計畫將探討當 本國政府實施進口關稅政策時, 在各種市場情況下, 本國政府將如何決定最適的進口關稅率, 以及多市場特性對本國政府選擇最適賀易政策的影響。 在此計畫中, 我將依序分析比較各種 模型設定下市場均衡的存在及差異, 以期能完整地探討此議題。
In the real world, when licensee serve multiple markets, the innovator could be both an insider patentee and an outsider patentee. The DVD-player industry is a good ex- ample, as some firms produce code free DVD-players while others produce DVD-players with region (country) codes. Therefore, in this project, I develop a model where part of markets served by the patentee and the licensee are independent. This assumption facilitates us to examine the licensing strategy that has been overlooked in the exist- ing literature. That is, the innovator can be either an insider patentee or an outsider patentee. I aim at proposing a general model which introduces multiple market and various technology licensing policies, to analyze how a licensor determines either a fixed fee or a royalty rate to license its technology to its rival, and the two firms choose the quantity in equilibrium under Cournot competitions. Besides, this project will analyze how the multiple market affects the optimal licensing contracts. Moreover, based on the proposed models in this project, I will examine the regulator how to choose the optimal tariff under various market conditions. In order to study this issue more clearly, I will systematically analyze the existence of the corresponding market equilibriums and the differences between them. |
