為了探討股權結構對董監事與CEO薪酬水準之影響，本研究以2005至2010年上市公司之資料進行實證。研究結果發現，法人持股比率與CEO薪酬呈負向關係，顯示機構法人對CEO薪酬具有抑制作用。實證結果亦發現，當董監事持股比率越高時，CEO薪酬與會計績效(市場績效)之關聯性越低(高)，此結果顯示，董監事偏愛以市場績效作為酬勞經理人之基礎。另外，當機構法人持股比率越高時，CEO薪酬與會計績效(市場績效)之關聯性越高(低)，顯示機構法人偏向採用會計基礎衡量經理人績效。然本研究並未發現，股權結構與董事薪酬水準具有顯著關聯性。
This study aims to explore the impact of ownership structure on compensation levels of directors, supervisors and CEOs. Using data from listed companies in the period from 2005 to 2010, we reach the following findings. First, the ratio of institu-tional ownership is negatively related to CEO compensation, indicating that the in-stitutional investor plays a role in reducing the growth of CEO pay. Second, an in-crease in directors and supervisors’ shareholdings reduces the relationship of accounting performance with CEO pay but increases the relevance between market performance and CEO compensation, showing that directors and supervisors prefer to reward managers based on market performance. However, an increase in institutional shareholdings improves the relationship between CEO pay and accounting performance but drives away the relevance between CEO pay and market performance, implying that institutional investors prefer to pay managers based on accounting performance. However, no relationships are found between ownership structure and compensation of directors and supervisors.
