| 摘要: | 企業國際擴張決策是新興經濟體中企業成長的重要策略，以台灣為例，近年也在國際經貿中嶄露頭角。本研究聚焦於企業國際擴張決策之前因探討，所關注的主要自變數為所有權結構中之家族持股，探討其對企業國際擴張決策之影響。過去研究多在探討家族持股的高低與企業國際擴張決策之關聯，研究結論並不一致，本研究考慮三種情境：其一，家族持股高低與企業國際擴張程度呈現先減後增的U型關係；其二，考慮亞洲新興國家重要的金字塔結構現象，以股份盈餘差來衡量股權偏離的情形，探討其對企業國際擴張決策的負向調節作用；其三，除持股高低外，本研究並進一步探討股權的分佈狀況，以HHI指數衡量股權集中度，探討對企業國際擴張決策的負向調節效果。本研究以台灣IT產業作為研究對象，資料型態為panel data，總計蒐集3,912筆樣本。根據實證結果發現，本研究所提出之三項假說均獲得支持，家族持股比例與企業國際擴張決策呈現U型關係，其最低點為38.7%。而此研究結果能對新興國家特有的家族特性所有權結構與企業國際擴張決策的關係，提供一個更清晰的分析架構。
Over the past decade, the world has witnessed what is arguably a new wave of globalization, by way of outward internationalization from emerging markets, including Taiwan. Many emerging economies firms are characterized as having family control. According prior studies, family owners may take risk-averse attitudes toward interna-tionalization and hence be reluctant to pursue internationalization until their ownership reaches the point where there is minimal threat of control loss. However, when family ownership is large enough to ensure family control, family owners have strong incentives to pursue ID to enhance long-term competitive advantage and spread their wealth outside the home country. Therefore, the level of family ownership in emerging econo-my firms will have a U-shaped relationship with internationalization. Two overlapping but distinct ownership characteristics, family control and ownership concentration, can be found in emerging economies. We employ the degrees of ownership as the measure-ment of family control, and use the Herfindahl index for all shareholdings to capture the overall degree of ownership concentration. It can similarly be argued that since owner-ship concentration, by definition, concentrates voting power in the hands of relatively few shareholders, it is easier to conjure majority support for initiatives such as outward internationalization. However, a number of factors offset this potentially positive relationship between ownership concentration and outward internationalization. And we think ownership concentration will moderated the negative relationship between family ownership and internationalization. Besides, prior studies also observe the phenomenon of excessive family control (through pyramid structures and cross-holdings) on the economic structure of East Asian societies, and find that the family has effective control over investment decisions in many companies and may channel these resources toward their own interest. It is expected that such tightly held and managed family firms will choose to expand operations locally rather than to pursue high-risk foreign market investments, thus avoiding the possibility of expropriation by outside investors. There-fore, we think excess family control will moderated the negative relationship between family ownership and internationalization. We using data on 789 publicly listed infor-mation technology industry firms in Taiwan during the 2003 to 2008 period and panel data regression models for analysis. This paper finds empirical evidence in support of our hypotheses. |
