摘要: | 據台灣公司法第二百零二條之規定「公司業務之執行,除本法或章程規定應由股東會決議之事項外,均應由董事會決議行之。」,此一規定賦予公司董事會莫大之決議權,且股東苟有議題欲提出,單只能在股東會上以臨時動議方式提出,致使股東無法充分瞭解該臨時動議提案與進而支持該提案,導致股東會之監督受到莫大的侷限。為因應時代之變遷與投資環境之變化,強化股東權益之保護,台灣之公司法於2005年修訂時,新增第一百七十二條之ㄧ「股東提案權」制度,祈使股東得以積極參與公司之營運,強化股東會運作機能,藉以防止公司經營管理層級濫權,侵蝕股東權益,以達強化公司治理之目的,祈使能更加完善保護中、小型股東之權益。
透過本論文之研究分析,除可得出臺灣與大陸兩地區目前現行法規機制之差異與各自法規制度問題外,亦可發現公司經營管理之利益衝突是存於控制經營股東和少數股東之間,苟台灣、大陸兩地區之現行法制業已增訂少數股東權利相關法規,藉以對控制經營股東產生相對之制衡,惟就此些制衡機制經過仔細研究探討後,可知其利益衝突解決之功能,表現尚未達預期之功能,亦無法充分促使股東投資之行為得以妥適進行。
然台灣與大陸公司治理方式亦有所不同,大陸主要屬於「集權主義制度」,台灣則屬於「均權主義制度」。公司屬營利為目的之法人,公司雖為權利義務之主體,具備「權利行使能力」及「行為能力」,其行為之行使尚需仰賴股東會之作為。
公司之股東會乃由全體股東構成,且為公司內部決定其行為意思之法定最高機關,惟股東雖係因出資而擁有公司之所有權,苟經濟市場自由發展與政策等因素,促使公司股權結構日趨複雜化,所有權與經營權分離之態樣日漸形成,公司投資股東僅可透過參與股東會之方式,間接影響公司之營運。股東為公司股份之所有人,得就其股份而對公司享有權利,然責任僅就其所認股份加以負擔,依據股東平等原則「公司就各股東基於股東地位,對公司享有之權利及負擔之義務一概平等對待」而言之,股東之法律地位亦應一律平等,股東基於其股東身分平等而享有權利、負擔義務,藉以保護少數股東之權益,得以使其權益不因控制股東之影響因而受有損害。就一般而言,控制股東相較於一般股東更加具備專業之影響能力,基此控制股東為公司創造收益、營收,並追求最大效益之公司利潤,本論文之論述並非禁止或管控公司控制股東之經營管理作為,反之應監督其公司營運之作為,以祈使控制股東不致侵害少數股東權益。
Article 202 of Taiwan’s Company Act gives the board of directors immense decision-making power as it requires that “all decisions regarding business operations of a company shall be made by the board of directors, except those required in the Company Act or relevant rules to be decided by the shareholders' meeting”. In other words, shareholders who wish to present a proposal can only do so by making a motion on the floor at the shareholders’ meeting, which prevents shareholders from fully understanding and supporting that proposal , hence the shareholders’ seriously jeopardized right to monitor a company. To keep up with global trends amid changes in the investment environment while offering further protection to the shareholders’ interests, a “shareholder proposal mechanism” was introduced in Article 172-1 when the Company Act was amended in 2005. This whole-new mechanism is intended to encourage shareholders to actively participate in company operations, to bolster the efficiency of shareholders’ meetings, to prevent the managers from abusing power or hurting the shareholders’ interest, and subsequently to strengthen company governance. It is therefore able to better safeguard the rights of med- and small-sized shareholders.
Findings from this paper not only reflect the difference between Taiwan and China in shareholder-related regulations and their respective problems, they also underscore the fact that the conflict of interest over company operations lies in the tension between controlling/operating shareholders and minority shareholders, Although regulations protecting the rights of minority shareholders have been introduced in both Taiwan and China to counteract the power of controlling/operating shareholders . A closer scrutiny of this carefully devised counterbalance system, nevertheless, indicates it fails to solve conflicts of interests as expected, which in turn prevents shareholders from making proper investments.
When it comes to corporate governance, China adopts a "totalitarian regime", compared to Taiwan’s "decentralization regime". A company is a profit-seeking legal entity that serves as a subject of rights and obligations. Despite its capacity to exercise rights and civil capacity, a company relies on the shareholders ' meeting to take valid actions.
Attended by all those holding a share in the company, the shareholders’ meeting are the company’s highest decision-making unit. While shareholders pay for a part of the company’s ownership, the development of freedom-oriented market economy and government policies lead to an increasingly complicated shareholding structure besides a trend toward separation between ownership and management. As a result, shareholders only have indirect influence on company operations through shareholders’ meetings. According to the size of share held, a shareholder is entitled to rights yet partially responsible for the company’s actions. Under the “equitable treatment of shareholders” principle, anyone with a shareholder’s status shall receive equal treatment with regard to rights and obligations. In other words, all shareholders are legally equal, with equitable rights and obligations. Such an arrangement is expected to protect the interests of minority shareholders from the threats of controlling shareholders.
As a rule, the controlling shareholders are more influential than non-controlling ones because of their professional expertise, based on which they create income/revenues for the company while maximizing corporate profits. Instead of prohibiting or imposing restrictions on their operating decisions, controlling shareholders should be monitored so as not to hurt minority interests, according to this paper’s author. |