公司治理機制分為內部機制與外部機制，而會計師在公司治理的外部機制裡扮演監督的角色，與內部機制之董事會職能相似，皆有助於提昇企業遵行相關的法令與揭露規範 (Chen and Jaggi, 2000)，進而增加企業的資訊透明度(陳瑞斌，2005)。在資訊氾濫的現今，分析師能給予投資大眾一個較具專業性且具有資訊內涵的盈餘預測，作為重要參考指標之一(李益收，2001)，而當企業的資訊揭露水準較佳時，會降低其預測誤差與離散性(Hope, 2003)。
本研究係以台灣上市(櫃)公司之電子產業為研究對象，探討公司的董事會獨立性、專業性與審計品質是否能降低企業與財務分析師之間的資訊不對稱，進而使財務分析師預測誤差越小。而樣本期間為2006年至2009年。本研究預期實證結果預期董事會獨立性、專業性與審計品質可以降低財務分析師預測誤差。
In the prevalence of information today, analysts can give a more professional and the investing public with the information content of earnings estimate, as one of the important reference pointers (Li , 2001). When the level of corporate disclosure is better, it will reduce the analysts forecasts error and dispersion (Hope, 2003). And the independent board who has the financial background can reduce the level of earnings management effectively, not only to improve the reliability of financial reporting, but also have a significant positive effect to the performance of company (Defond, Hann, and Hu, 2005; Hsieh, 2004; Yeh, 2006).
In this research, taking companies listed in Taiwan Security Exchange and OTC for instance to explore whether the board independence and board expertise and audit quality can reduce information asymmetry between company and financial analysts, and thus the forecast error of financial analysts become smaller. The sample period is from 2006 to 2009. The empirical result of this study is expected that the board independence and board expertise and audit quality can reduce financial analyst forecast errors.
