| 摘要: | 本研究目的在於探討董事獨立性與監督誘因對公司績效與經理人酬勞關係之影響，研究期間自2006 至2009 年，研究對象為國內上市櫃公司。實證結果指出，經理人酬勞與會計績效之敏感度大於其與市場績效之敏感度；董事獨立性會降低會計績效與經理人薪酬敏感度，而增加市場績效與薪酬敏感度，顯示獨立董事較偏向以市場績效為經理人報酬衡量之基準。另外，監督誘因會降低會計績效、市場績效與經理人酬勞之敏感度，顯示董監事持股比率愈高，會降低酬勞之合理性。
This study aims to examine the impact of independence and monitoring incentive of directors and supervisors on the relationship between firm performance and CEO compensation. To conduct this research, I investigate firms listing on the
Taiwan stock exchange market and over-the–counter market in the period from 2006 to 2009. My findings indicate as follows. First, the sensitivity of CEO compensation to accounting performance is higher than that to market performance. Second, board dependence is negatively associated with the sensitivity of compensation to accounting performance while positively related to the sensitivity of compensation to market performance, showing that independent directors prefer to use market-based indicators to measure CEO performance. Finally, monitoring incentive is negatively associated with the sensitivity of CEO rewards to both accounting and market performances, showing that CEO compensation policy will be diverted toward less rational when directors and supervisors gain more ownership. |
