近年來，憲法的意涵已由保障少數的自由民主主義，演化爲與舊政權決裂的宣示。而其合法性基礎，則建立於「人民主權」或「多數制憲」的概念。但對內部存在分歧的台灣社會，企圖透過多數進行憲改，卻引發了國家認同的疑慮，進而造成憲政實施的困局。有人因此認爲，唯有化解國家認同歧異，台灣才可能正常行憲。本文由美國的立憲經驗觀察，認爲行憲與認同其實可以同步達成。癥結在於：憲政的結構設計，是否能對分歧的少數提出充分的權益保障。但遺憾的是，當前的憲改方向，因過度強調多數意志，似乎反其道而行。
Most modern states have a document called "constitution." Writing a new constitution or revising an existing one is seen by many emerging democracies as an important gesture proclaiming their condemnation of the authoritarian and backward past. In order to separate from the past, these constitutions acquire legitimacy through popular support. Nevertheless, too much emphasis on popular support overlooks an important fact: that a constitution was originally developed to restrict political power, including the power wielded by the majority. Taiwan is a heterogeneous, even divided, society, yet it follows a similar approach in its constitutional reform. As a result, the constitution may be revised with a majority vote, at least on the surface, yet failing to assure the minority rights has raised doubt on its legitimacy. Many attribute this constitutional instability to the national identity division. They argue that a reasonable constitutional order would be out of the question before a consensus on national identity can be realized. Yet, this article believes that the reverse is also true: national identity would be difficult to consolidate without a respectable constitutional structure. To the chagrin of the author, many in Taiwanese society try to strengthen national identity by giving more constitutional power to the majority, which, seems to the author, weakens respect for the constitution. As the vicious cycle illustrates, society has been further divided as constitutional revisions occurred one after another.
