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    請使用永久網址來引用或連結此文件: https://irlib.pccu.edu.tw/handle/987654321/18321


    題名: 公司治理中會計師的審計功能:以賽局理論分析
    作者: 王茂昌
    邱士宗
    貢獻者: 會計系
    關鍵詞: 公司治理
    道德危險
    賽局理論
    審計
    會計師
    日期: 2010-03
    上傳時間: 2010-12-23 14:24:46 (UTC+8)
    摘要: 本文旨在分析於建立及落實公司治理的環境下,假設企業需要採增資方式來籌資,來探討會計師之審計功能,以瞭解企業家及會計師的策略選擇。本文建構一個賽局模型來探討有關公司治理的議題,研究模型同時考量企業家與會計師之角色,並運用賽局理論推導其均衡條件及結果。研究發現建立及落實公司治理,能減少企業家與會計師勾結行為的誘因,促使企業家誠實報導並能維持會計師的獨立性;另落實會計師的審計功能,有助於解決投資不足的問題,且不同投資專案特色的企業其會計師宜具備不同的專業聲譽。
    The main purposes of this study are to discuss the auditing function of the auditor in the situation that the firm must fund by equity capital under the environment of building and implementing the corporate governance, and to understand the strategy choice of managers and auditors. This study is derived the equilibrium condition and finding by game theory. The research model considers the role of the manager and the auditor. The main results are: Building and implementing the corporate governance will reduce the motivation of collusion between the manager and the auditor, and the manager will report honestly, and the auditor will maintain his independence. The more the effect of auditor's auditing function is, the more the contribution for solving the under-capitalizing problem, and the firm with different investment project must engage the auditor with different professional reputation.
    關聯: 東吳經濟商學學報 68期 P.39-59
    顯示於類別:[會計學系暨研究所 ] 期刊論文

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