獨立性查核制度對公司操控裁決性應計項目影響之研究

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题名:	獨立性查核制度對公司操控裁決性應計項目影響之研究 The Study of Audit Independent System Effect on Manipulation of Discretionary Accruals of Companies
作者:	方顯光陳國嘉蕭裕達
贡献者:	財金系
关键词:	裁決性應計項目獨立性查核查核品質 Discretionary accruals Independent auditing Auditing quality
日期:	2009-03
上传时间:	2010-12-23 11:18:30 (UTC+8)
摘要:	本文係探討上市公司經理人在何種財務狀況下，受到自利動機的影響及未顧及股東最大權利下撥弄裁決性應計項目的行為；以及受到會計師獨立性查核情況下，公司利用裁決性應計項目調升盈餘的程度。本文以Jones(1991)所設計的Model計算裁決性應計項目，作為衡量會計師獨立性查核的指標，並分別檢視我國上市公司2002年至2006年間，公司受會計師獨立性查核之公司其公司經理人操控裁決性應計項目之間的關聯性。本文研究發現：(1)公司經理人在營運資金流量充足、公司規模小、負債比率低及破產指數高的情況，公司經理人較無動機撫弄裁決性應計項目；(2)通常在公司營利佳、營運規模大的情況下，比較會尋找高審計品質會計師事務所查核公司財務報表；以及(3)有足夠的營運資金與低負債比率的專業經理人，並不會因為受高查核品質查核之會計師查核公司財務報表，而特意操弄裁決性應計項目。 The purpose of this research wants to explore how a senior manager of listed company can manipulate financial statements/accounting entries without taking the maximum shareholder's benefits into consideration. The research also uses the cash flows for operation, company size, debt ratio and bankrupt index as the independent variables and the decisive accounting entries as a dependent variable, to measure the relation among them. Audit independence of accountant would be quantified to high quality of audit and low quality of audit. The manipulation of accounting entries related to level of audit quality is also investigated. This research uses Jones Model absolute value of discretionary accruals to measure the independent degree of accountant. It also oversees the relation between independence of accountant and manipulation of discretionary accruals for the listed companies from 2002 to 2006. The research uses the cash flows for operation, company size, debt ratio and bankrupt index as independent variables of inspection if senior managers manipulate discretionary accruals. Using the cash flows for operation, company size, EBIT and debt ratio to test whether the independence of accountant has impacts on manipulation of discretionary accruals. The experimental result of a senior manager in a company with low cash flows for operation, small company size, low debt ratio and high level of bankruptcy (Z<1.3 bankruptcy, Z>2.90 non-bankruptcy) has lower incentives to manipulate discretionary accruals. In the perspective of independence of accountant, companies with better profits, large company size tend to cooperate with high quality of accounting firm. Senior managers in a company with sufficient cash flows and low debt ratio would not tend to manipulate discretionary accruals. In other words, the high quality accounting firms have a better customer choice than the low quality ones in the Competitive circumstance.
關聯:	華人經濟研究 7:1 2009.03[民98.03] 頁59-77
显示于类别:	[財務金融學系 ] 期刊論文

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