經濟與法律文獻均強調競爭機關的獨立性可加強執法績效。然而本研究嘗試以廣 義的寇斯理論觀點，證明二者並不必然呈現絕對的正向關係。易言之，高獨立性 不一定代表高執法績效。原因在於：個別國家的政經環境存在著一個制度性門 檻，決定二者間關係的正負。就開發中國家而言，不良的制度環境易使執法機關 暴露於賄賂與暴力威脅之下，因此，競爭體制必須朝向低度獨立的設計，以避免 弊端。反之，已開發國家的政經環境則已跨越制度性門檻，使競爭機關獨立性與 執法績效能夠呈現正向關係，因此，可以利用高度獨立的競爭機關體制，以提高 反托拉斯績效。雖然在均衡時，二者的獨立性高低不等，但是，就制度設計而言， 卻都是反映現實政經環境的最佳妥協，從而各自形成了一個可執行的寇斯契約。 The IO literature emphasizes that the independence of the competition authority can enhance antitrust effectiveness. Nevertheless, from a broader viewpoint of the Coase theorem, this article indicates that the relationship is not necessarily either linear or positive. In other words, a high level of authority independence does not necessarily lead to a better enforcement of competition law. There exists an institutional threshold which determines whether or not authority independence can promote antitrust effectiveness. For the LDCs that fail to exceed the threshold, the relatively weak institutions make the agencies more susceptible to corruption or coercion. Hence, their competition regimes have moved in the direction of adjudication by less independent (government-controlled) agencies so as to prevent corruption. In the DCs, the institutional frameworks have passed the threshold level that has allowed antitrust effectiveness to increase with authority independence. Thus, they have moved toward adjudication through their relatively independent agencies. Both outcomes have been found to be efficient at the time in light of their respective environments. As a result, these arrangements can literally be regarded to be the result of an enforceable Coasian contract.
