| 摘要: | 近年來全球普遍關注環境惡化和資源耗竭現象，使得有關共有資源和共有財產權的研究領域受到重視。陽明山竹子湖地區以自然環境為基礎的觀光資源是典型的共有資源，其排他性困難與擁擠互競性高的資源特性，有過度使用與缺乏維護誘因的傾向。近年來因遊客增加，觀光休閒業商機可觀，當地普遍存在的違規餐飲營業行為，及其所衍生的諸多環境衝擊、生態破壞等問題，引發不同權益關係人之間的緊張關係，成為管理當局所面臨並亟待解決的問題。本研究主要從結構的、制度的觀點，探討竹子湖地區不同權益關係人對此共有資源管理議題存在何種利益、價值和權力的歧異？分析地區經濟、社會政治力分配對於保育集體行動、制度力建構的影響及互動關係，期能提供有效聯結經濟誘因與環境保育的對策，對於外部制度的調整提出建議。為達本研究探討個案背景脈絡、誘因、集體行動與內外部制度的動態互動關係，主要採取具歸納取向的質性研究方法，其中以半結構式深度訪談為主，輔以非正式訪談、參與觀察與文獻資料蒐集分析；尤其透過「目的取樣」決策，選擇特定的關鍵人士進行訪談，而得以獲得有利研究的資料，並以不同來源面向的資料進行交叉檢測以拼出趨近現狀事實。
研究發現，竹子湖共有資源管理問題的癥結，在於高價值的環境資源與弱勢的制度機制，給予少數地方菁英利用環境資源汲取私人財富的機會，而未按照「開發者保護、破壞者恢復」的原則承擔相應的生態環境責任；上述菁英掠奪現象的持續存在，加大了地方內部的利益分歧，導致社會資本的流失，從而削弱了保育集體行動和健全管理制度發展的過程。而公部門管理途徑則受限於法規落後及監督管理誘因低落而未能積極面對導正，造成其他居民環境權益及公共財的損失。總結而言，竹子湖地區少數菁英掠奪環境資源利益，導致保育集體行動潰散的情況能否轉變，關鍵在於未來各方權益關係人，如何在公部門的主導下，建立公平合理的商業利益回饋制度，並公平分配相關各方環境保護責任和義務，才可能有效聯結經濟發展誘因和環境保護行動。建議公部門管理當局應對竹子湖地區重新進行商業規劃，以開發許可權的形式，建立觀光休閒產業的生態環境服務付費制度，並成立公私協力的管理體系，以公平調節相關權益各方的環境保護責任和權利義務，實現地區共有環境資源的永續經營。
In recent years there has been worldwide concern over environmental degradation and resource depletion, focusing research attention on common-pool resources and rights. The Jhuzihhu area in Yang Ming Shan, Taiwan, typifies natural resource-based, tourism-oriented common-pool resources characterized by competition between crowding and difficulties of exclusion, tendencies to overuse, and lack of maintenance incentives. Recent increases in visitors, opportunities for the tourism and leisure industry, widespread violations by local catering businesses, as well as numerous secondary environmental impacts and ecological degradation, have led to tensions between different interests and have confronted management with urgent problems. This study, from a structural and institutional viewpoint, investigated the relationships between parties of different interests, values, and authority in the Jhuzihhu area regarding common property resource management issues. It analyzed the distribution of regional economic and sociopolitical authority in collective conservation action and the impact and structuring of institutional authority in order to provide an effective link between economic incentives and environmental conservation measures as well as recommendations for external institutional adjustments. To achieve this, the study investigated case background contexts, incentives, collective action, and dynamic interaction of external and internal institutions, employing a primarily inductive approach with qualitative research methods. Primary among these were semi-structured in-depth interviews supplemented by informal interviews, participant observation, data collection, and analysis of literature. In particular, through a “purposive sampling” strategy, selecting specific key persons for interview, the study was able to obtain usable data and, by cross-checking different sources of information, was able to describe a close-to-factual state of affairs.
The study found that the crux of the Jhuzihhu common-pool resources management problem was high-value environmental resources and weak institutional mechanisms, giving a few local elites the opportunity to use common environmental resources for private wealth and not, according to the “developer protect, destroyer restore” principle, to bear corresponding responsibility for the ecological environment. The persistence of this phenomenon of predatory elites increases the divergence of local interests, leading to the loss of social capital, thus weakening collective conservation action and the development of sound management institutions. The public sector management approach, limited by regulations and low regulatory incentives, lags behind and is unable to positively face correction, resulting in loss of environmental rights and common property to other residents. In conclusion, the key to changing the status quo, of a few elite interests exploiting environmental resources in the Jhuzihhu area and consequent collapse of collective conservation action, lies in the future relationships of all interest parties: how under the auspices of the public sector to establish a fair and reasonable commercial interest feedback system and a fair and equitable distribution of responsibilities among interested parties in order to combine economic development and environmental protection incentives. It is suggested that public sector management authorities revise commercial planning for the Jhuzihhu area via a development permit system, featuring environmental services payments for establishment of tourism and leisure industries, and the establishment of a public-private partnership management system to equitably adjust the rights of parties relating to environmental protection interests and responsibilities, thereby achieving sustainable management of common environmental resources in the area. |
